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RESEARCH NOTES 
The Rationality oj Economic Voting Revisited 
Motoshi Suzuki 
Kwansei Gakuin University, japan 
Henry W. Chappell Jr. 
Lniversity of South Carolina 
One aspect of rationalitl invoh·es the prospecti' c or rctrospecti,e outlook of, oters; ,mother con 
cerm voters' knowledge of feasibilitv constraints. Rationality is usuall, taken to mcan that agents arc 
both forward~looking and aware of constraints, but it is not possible to associate \Oter rationality with 
any particular behavioral regularity unless objectives and constraints are specified. We examine voter 
rationality using post-World War II L.S. national election data. Our c' idence cannot reject the ,·il'\\ 
that voting is rational. Presidential and congressional election outcomes reflect marginal IOters' awarc· 
ness of economic constraints and thc implications of ,ote choices t,)r their I()ng~tcrm economic \\ ell~ 
being. Particularly, the voters arc more sensitiw to permanent than c,·clical economlC growth when 
these two components arc distinguished by a decomposition that finds a I.lq;C, stochastic trend in thc 
output process. The concern with permanent growth would encourage ~o\ernmcnts to adopt policies 
that promote long-term rather tha", short-term incomc [2:aim. 
The ability of representative democracies to satisf~ the wants and needs of voters 
ultimately depends on the quality of individual voters' judgments. Although 
democracies may not always produce optimal results even when voters are individ-
ually optimizing, few would doubt that outcomes would be \\orse if voters were 
poorly informed, illogical, or manipulable. Scholars have dC\oted considerable ef-
forts to the task of characterizing the extent ohoter rationality.! According to the 
"rational choice" paradigm, rationality implies goal-directed, optimizing behavior. 
The rationality assumption neither prescribes nor prohibits any particular beha\-
ioral regularity. Rather, the assumption imposes the condition that heha\ior should 
enhance the achievement of goals subject to feasibility constraints. Behavior deemed 
rational under one set of constraints might instead he regarded as irrational in other 
contexts. Thus, rationality is contingent on institutional arrangements forming 
feasibility constraints within which behavior takes place. 
Existing studies examining voter rationality han: each rclicd on single particu-
laristic assumptions about the underlying institutional structure without exploring 
the implications of other alternative assumptions. Since there exists no consensus 
1 '\hero political~eeonomic studies examining; ,oter rationalin includc \lcsina, Londrepn, and 
Rosenthal (1993); Alesina and Rosentbal (1989); Chappell and Keech (1985); \1acKul'I1, Erikson, and 
Stimson (1992); Peltzman (1990); and Suzuki (1991). 
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on assumptions, it is risky to evaluate the rationality hypothesis based solely on any 
single assumption. Our purpose is to test the rationality hypothesis using alterna-
tive assumptions and to offer further evidence that might distinguish rational and 
naive voting. In what follows, we hypothesize that rational well-informed voters 
would reward permanent income gains more than cyclical gains. We estimate aggre-
gate vote functions for U.S. national elections in which permanent and cyclical 
components of income growth appear separately as explanatory variables. If votes 
are more responsive to the permanent component, this would favor the rational 
voter hypothesis. 
In examining voter evaluations of macroeconomic conditions, researchers have 
highlighted two dimensions of rationality. First, rationality requires that voters be 
forward-looking when they cast ballots. Thus, models distinguishing prospective 
from retrospective voting are informative about voter rationality. But, since voters 
necessarily must make their prospective forecasts on the basis of current and past 
data, distinguishing prospective and retrospective orientations is intrinsically 
difficult. 2 In contrast, the second dimension of rationality concerns voters' aware-
ness of feasibility constraints. Most studies of voting behavior have ignored the 
issue of feasibility constraints, and have implicitly assumed that such constraints 
are irrelevant for voters. Thus, voters are viewed as rewarding economic growth 
and punishing inflation, while assuming that outcomes for these two variables are 
independently controllable by policymakers. 
For our purposes, it is useful to think of economic knowledge as describing the 
feasibility constraints that relate permanent and temporary changes in income, or 
output, to one another. Permanent output change is driven by productive capacity 
(i.e., the aggregate production function and its movements over time) in the econ-
omy. Manipulating aggregate demand can at best produce temporary output gains, 
while supply shocks often have long-lasting impacts on output (Nelson and Plosser 
1982). Although supply shocks are referred to as technology shocks, there is ample 
room for government to influence them (Barro 1990; King and Rebelo 1990). 
Governments make decisions about regulatory policies, the protection of property 
rights, the provision of public infrastructure, and levels of marginal tax rates and 
subsidies. Providing the proper dose of public intervention while maintaining pri-
vate incentives for work and saving is an important governmental task. Those gov-
ernments that succeed produce positive technology shocks, while those that fail 
produce negative ones. 
It is unquestionably difficult for the electorate to monitor the government's mi-
croeconomic policy programs directly. For voters, it is much easier to observe and 
2 MacKuen, Erikson, and Stimson (1992) used aggregate survey measures of retrospective and 
prospective economic evaluations to explain presidential approval, and found results which favor the 
importance of prospective evaluations. Whether the prospective evaluations were rationally formed re-
mains questionable, however. Suzuki (1991) argued that under some macroeconomic environments ob-
served voting behavior will not differ under the competing hypotheses of rational-prospective and 
adaptive-retrospective behavior. 
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evaluate aggregate economic outcomes like the growth rate of output. Such out-
comes reflect the effects of exogenous random shocks as well as the systematic con-
sequences of government policies. Individuals are likely to make some implicit 
judgments about the permanence of economic growth, if only to aid in their private 
decisions about work, leisure, consumption, and saving. Individuals will attempt to 
distinguish permanent growth (the long-term trend component of their income 
growth that can be sustained in the future given the past and present income levels) 
from transitory cyclical growth (the remaining component of their income growth). 
For example, they might not drastically alter their life-styles because of exception-
ally high income growth that is not expected to continue. Individuals have incen-
tives to make such distinctions in an informed manner and may use the information 
originally acquired for normal private economic activities to make political decisions 
at times of elections. 3 It may be reasonable for voters to reward incumbent politi-
cians for permanent growth, while not rewarding or punishing them for less desir-
able cyclical growth, which is often followed by rising inflation. This is true for two 
reasons. First, when information is imperfect, this behavior provides a reasonable 
selection mechanism: one must choose among competing politicians who vary in 
innate competence (Alesina, Londregan, and Rosenthal 1993). Second, it provides 
an appropriate incentive structure in the context of a principal-agent problem: the 
principal (the electorate) wishes to motivate desirable policies from the agent (the 
government) who might shirk in the absence of oversight (peltzman 1990). 
Aggregate presidential and congressional vote studies have consistently indi-
cated that real income growth is associated with favorable election outcomes for the 
incumbent party (Chappell and Suzuki 1993; Kramer 1971; Fair 1978). The con-
ventional interpretation is that voters are naively retrospective. If this is so, manip-
ulative incumbent politicians might successfully elicit voter support by manipu-
lating aggregate demand and producing (unsustainable) booms. Indeed, Nordhaus's 
(1975) political business cycle model was structured around voting behavior pat-
terned after the empirical results indicating possible voter naivete. 
Our earlier discussion suggests an alternative interpretation of the link between 
votes and economic growth. We noted that technology shocks induced by micro-
economic policies will have long-lasting impacts on productivity and wealth, while 
manipulating aggregate demand will have only temporary impacts. If some govern-
ments produce good microeconomic policies with lasting impacts, they should be 
rewarded. Similarly, governments whose microeconomic policies are less desirable 
will produce lasting reductions in national economic well-being and should be pun-
ished. Voters necessarily face a difficult problem in discriminating between tempo-
rary output fluctuations originating on the demand side of the economy and lasting 
increases in output originating on the production side. But, if to voters the im-
portance of permanence in output growth looms larger compared with temporary 
'Even if there exists a handful of rational voters, uninformed voters might obtain voting cues from in-
formed voters and would be able to vote in a sophisticated manner (Lupia 1994). 
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change, one can resurrect a rational voter interpretation of conventional vote func-
tion estimates.4 
There exist three recent papers on voting outcomes built from the insight that 
microeconomic policies may induce politically relevant permanent changes in out-
put. First, Peltzman (1990) explained votes for the president across time and states 
employing a model in which consumption growth rather than output growth was 
the key economic performance measure. The logic was based on the permanent in-
come hypothesis. That theory posits that consumption is sensitive to changes in 
permanent income, but much less sensitive to cyclical income changes: if con-
sumers think that income change is transitory, their consumption will not change. 
Thus, movements in consumption should closely mirror shifts in the underlying 
(but not directly observable) permanent income component. Peltzman showed that 
votes for the incumbent president's party are associated with consumption growth. 
Second, Alesina and Rosenthal (1989), using aggregate data from congressional 
elections, found some evidence to indicate that voters actually punish cyclical 
changes in income, both positive and negative ones. Since macroeconomic instabil-
ity is undesirable, this is compatible with the rational voting hypothesis. However, 
Alesina and Rosenthal assumed that the permanent component of income change is 
captured by a steady trend and is thus politically neutral. Moreover, they found 
little impact of economic conditions on congressional voting when mid-term effects 
were properly accounted for. Third, Alesina, Londregan, and Rosenthal (1993) ad-
vanced a model in which voters focus on policymakers' "competence" shocks. Com-
petence was assumed to follow an MA(1) process, so that the current period's 
competence is informative about the next period's. Their model is restrictive in its 
specification of the process for competence shocks, and results based on U.S. voting 
data from 1916-1988 are inconclusive on the issue of rational versus naive voting. 
Our approach offers the advantage of flexible empirical specifications to decom-
pose output growth into permanent and cyclical components. This permits a more 
direct test than that undertaken by Peltzman (1990) who used consumption spend-
ing as a proxy for permanent income. It also offers the prospect of better measure-
ment of permanent and cyclical growth components than Alesina and Rosenthal 
(1989) or Alesina, Londregan, and Rosenthal (1993). In Alesina and Rosenthal 
(1989) the permanent component was represented by a simple linear trend; in 
Alesina, Londregan, and Rosenthal (1993) the persistence of competency, as mod-
eled by the MA(1) process, extended only one period into the future. In the follow-
ing sections we describe our empirical model and estimation strategy. Then, we 
4Several empirical studies have suggested that voters might be aware of macroeconomic constraints. 
Chappell and Keech (1985), for one, developed a model of presidential approval based on an explicit 
voter understanding of macroeconomic constraints as described by an expectations-augmented Phillips 
curve. This approach was limited by the adoption of an expectational Phillips Curve as the relevant con-
straint, with an implicit assumption that policymakers' influences on output and unemployment were 
purely transitory. In empirically comparing naive and sophisticated models, they could not clearly dis-
tinguish the better voting model. 
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present our findings and sensitivity test results. The final section of the article 
summarizes the results and discusses implications. 
EMPIRICAL A]\;AI.YSIS 
We investigate the rational voting hypothesis by estimating aggregate vote func-
tions. Although it seems peculiar to evaluate hypotheses about individuals' thought 
processes with highly aggregated data, this is appropriate for several reasons. First, 
as Kramer (1983) noted, the economic conditions for which governments are re-
sponsible are general-fluctuations in the economic status of particular individuals 
are largely idiosyncratic and unrelated to government policies. To evaluate re-
sponses to the general conditions, it is most appropriate to investigate aggregate 
voter responses to changes in the general conditions over time. Second, if our in-
terest in voter behavior is motivated by a concern for the incentives provided to 
elected policy makers, it is clearly the response of aggregate vote totals that is most 
relevant. Finally, for modeling purposes, the rationality assumption need not liter-
ally be true of all individuals to be useful. If we find that enough marginal voters 
behave rationally to explain a significant part of the variance in electoral outcomes, 
the rational voter hypothesis can be accepted as useful. 
The general vote model we estimate consists of the following three-equation sys-
tem that extends the specification developed in Chappell and Suzuki (1993):; 
where: 
STj= f30 + f31q; + f3zqf + f33C + f3.SINC, + f3;MT, + Es, 
HTj = ')'0 + ,)"q; + ')'zq(, + ')'3C, + ')'4 H1NC, + ')'jNIT, + Ell! 
pv, = The incumbent party's vote percentage of the two-party vote in the presi-
dential election (if such an election takes place). 
Sv, = The percentage of the nationwide two-party vote in Senate elections 
which favors the party of the incumbent president. 
HV, = The percentage of the nationwide two-party vote in House elections 
which favors the party of the incumbent president. 
q; = The permanent component of the change in real gross national product 
(GNP) in an election year from the previous year. 
q~' = The cyclical component of the change in real GNP in an election year from 
the previous year. 
C, = The (net) candidate advantage of the incumbency party's presidential can-
didate. This variable is set equal to zero in mid-term congressional elections. 
DPER, = A dummy variable equal to one if an incumbent president is running 
for reelection, otherwise equal to zero. 
'Sec Chappell and Suzuki (1993) for the detailed definitions of the noneconomic \"anables. 
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SING, = The percentage of Senate members whose seats are being contested 
and who belong to the incumbent president's party. 
HINC, = The percentage of House members whose seats are being contested 
and who belong to the incumbent president's party. 
M7; = A dummy variable equal to one if elections are midterm; otherwise equal 
to zero.6 
Ept) ESt) and EH, are random error terms drawn from a multivariate normal 
distribution. 
a" {3" and 'Y, are parameters to be estimated. 
Our model highlights the permanent and cyclical growth variables to test the ra-
tionality hypothesis suggested earlier. The analysis requires the construction of 
permanent and cyclical components through decomposing the actual time series of 
interest-real GNP. Different decomposing methods advance distinct assump-
tions about the underlying economic structure that may result in different distri-
butional properties for the derived permanent and cyclical components. However, 
there exists no consensus view regarding the appropriate choice of a statistical de-
composition. And, given the low power of tests examining the long-run properties 
of time series, it is difficult to choose the best method for a particular series. Thus, 
we have decided to adopt an agnostic approach and report the results under three 
alternative decomposition specifications. These specifications generate permanent 
and cyclical output components, assuming that the permanent component, or the 
trend, is (1) approximated by individuals' aggregate consumption (PL decomposi-
tion) (Peltzman 1990), (2) a log random walk with drift-a constant long-term 
growth rate (BN decomposition) (Beveridge and Nelson 1981), and (3) a smooth 
stochastic process (HP filter) (Hod rick and Prescott 1980). 
The PL decomposition computes the permanent income component as the fitted 
values of the regression of real GNP on real personal consumption and computes 
the cyclical component as the residuals of the regression. The logic of this decom-
position relies on the permanent income hypothesis that Peltz man (1990) used in 
his specification. Peltzman used consumption as a proxy for the permanent income 
component and did not include the cyclical component in his model. Our specifica-
tion here is an explicit decomposition of income consistent with Peltzman. The PL 
decomposition may provide a reasonable separation of the real and permanent 
components of growth, but it does not specify the structure of the growth process 
explicitly. 
On the other hand, the BN and HP decompositions impose explicit assumptions 
on the structure of the time series in question to estimate its permanent and cycli-
cal components. The BN decomposition assumes that the output process has a unit 
root that is entirely due to the permanent component of the series. Technology 
shocks to the permanent component are stochastic: the rate of technological change 
6 Alesina and Rosenthal (1989) noted that omission of this variable can introduce a bias, since early-
term partisan economic changes are likely to be empirically confounded with midterm effects. 
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is highly variable over time. The trend is defined as the value the output process 
would reach after all cyclical dynamics work themselves out. Thus, the cycle is 
defined as the sum of future changes in output forecastable at time t and can be ob-
tained by recursively producing forecasts of future output growth. The trend can 
be computed as the current actual output value plus all expected future growth. 7 
On the contrary, the HP filter represents a generalization of simple detrending 
methods, assuming that the rate of technological change varies across time, but not 
too rapidly: the permanent output component evolves gradually at variable speeds 
over time. The extent to which the permanent component mimics the actual out-
put path depends on a parameter value selected by the researcher. The choice for 
this parameter value is arbitrary; we use the same value used by Kydland and 
Prescott (1990). 8 The size and volatility of the permanent components estimated 
via the two methods should be different because of the different structural assump-
tions imposed by them. The HP filter produces a smaller and less volatile perma-
nent component than the BN method does. We will show this point graphically 
later in the article. We recognize that voters do not go through complex calcula-
tions to distinguish permanent and cyclical growth. But, if voters make implicit 
judgments about the permanence of economic conditions in an informed manner, 
their implicit judgments can be approximated by a statistical decomposition. 
'The BN decomposition was performed via the procedure suggested by Beveridge and Nelson 
(1981). They define the trend of a time series as its current observed value plus all forecastable future 
changes in the series beyond the mean rate of drift. To predict future changes, a well specified AR.v1A 
model is needed. We used an AR(2) model: 
IlQ, = <PIIlQ, I + <P2IlQ,-, + IL(I - <PI - <1>,) + E, 
where Q, is the natural logarithm of quarterly real GNP in period I, /),. is the first-difference operator, E, 
is a random shock in period I, IL is a constant, and <P., are the autoregressive parameters. Then, using the 
AR(2) model, we recursively forecasted the future changes up to T + 100, /)"12." I, /),.12.,-2, ... , /)"12." Inn· 
The forecast horizon was set at 100 for a quarterly series as in Beveridge and Nelson. The estimate of 
the permanent component was obtained by summing the current level and the forecast changes less the 
change due to drift, 100A- (the constant is part of the trend and is included in the AR(2) model.): 
The terms in the bracket constitute an estimate of the cyclical component. The variance of shocks, or 
innovations in the permanent component, is determined by data: it is larger or smaller, depending on 
the autocorrelation structure of a particular series in question. 
80ur description of the HP filter follows that provided by Kydland and Prescott (1990). Let Q for 
1 = I, 2, ... , T, indicate the natural logarithm of real GNP. The trend component for that series, de-
noted as Qf, for 1 = 1, 2, ... , T, minimizes 
~(Q, - Qf)2 + A~[(Q,fl - QrJ - (QI' - Q,P,)l' 
(-1 1=2 
where A is a parameter that penalizes the variability of the trend. Kydland and Prescott (1990) suggest 
that the value of the A parameter for a quarterly series be set to 1600 that implies which the standard 
error of the cycle is 40 times larger than the standard error of the trend. We have followed their sugges-
tion. The cyclical component is given:12.'1 = Q, - 12.;. 
9 . I ! iI 3221 sq T II II 9 PI III 
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TABLE 1 
EFFECTS OF PERMANENT AND TRANSITORY GROWTH ON VOTES 
Decomposition 
President Senate House 
Method qP q' qP q' qP q' LLa 
Peltzman (PL) 1.74'" .44 .58 .... -.47 .52'" -.42 -73.79 
(.27) (.86) (.21) (.36) (.\6) (.26) 
Beveridge & Nelson 1.72 .... -.26 .36 -.83 .24 -.33 -73.39 
(BN) (.28) (.87) (.22) (.90) (.19) (.74) 
Hodrick & Prescott 1.67" 2.02 .... .57 .20 .97 .... .04 -75.62 
(HP) (.46) (.34) (.50) (.20) (.35) (.\3) 
Kramer & Fair 1.89 .... .27 .23" -74.80 
(Conventional) (.29) (.18) (.14) 
Notes: Standard errors are in parentheses. Each vote model was fully specified as described in the 
text and was estimated via the maximum likelihood procedure. In this table, coefficient estimates for 
noneconomic variables and the regression constant are not shown for brevity. The full estimates are 
available from the authors upon request. 
"Log-likelihood function value. 
"p < .05 one-tail test; "'P < .01 one-tail test. 
We jointly estimated the three vote equations based on the alternative decompo-
sition methods over the 1948-1992 period by employing seemingly unrelated re-
gressions (SUR) technique.9 The SUR estimates summarized in table I provide 
mixed support for the rationality hypothesis. First, results based on the PL decom-
position suggest that marginal voters treat permanent and cyclical growth differ-
ently and sensibly at the three levels of national elections. The rationality hypothe-
sis postulates a2, f3 2, 1'2 > 0 and a 3, f3 3, 1'3 ~ O. The results in the first row of 
table 1 confirm a2, f3z, 1'2> 0 and a3, f33, 1'3 = 0 under normal statistical stan-
dards. Results based on the BN decomposition in the second row also show the 
substantial positive impacts of permanent growth and no significant effects of 
cyclical growth in the three equations. The vote estimates from the two decompo-
sitions are similar because the permanent growth rates estimated via the two meth-
ods share similar statistical properties: they are correlated with one another on the 
order of .73 during the 1948-1992 annual period. This implies that the BN de-
composition approximates the PL specification with respect to marginal voters' im-
plicit judgments about the permanence of economic growth. From the statistical 
structure of the BN decomposition, one can argue that individuals might perceive 
a large permanent component in growth; such perception is well reflected on their 
consumption behavior, as posited by the permanent income hypothesis. 
'For estimation, we used a generalized least squares (GLS) estimator. GLS estimates are asymptoti-
cally equivalent to conditional maximum-likelihood estimates, having the same asymptotic distributions 
as full information maximum-likelihood estimates. See Chappell and Suzuki (1993) for the GLS esti-
mation procedure and for documentation of efficiency improvements created by a SUR technique. 
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We conducted a sensitivity test regarding the assumption of equal coefficients 
for permanent and cyclical growth components. The test rejected the equal coeffi-
cients assumption, which is equivalent to rejecting the conventiunal model in favor 
of a rational model. lO Yet the results for the Kramer-Fair conventional model 
shown in table 1 are similar to those for the rational models based on the BN and 
PL decompositions. One reason is that the specifications classify a large portion of 
real fluctuations as permanent. If most growth is permanent, the rational and non-
rational vote models would be expected to produce very similar results: the nonra-
tional model closely approximates a rational model. Although the conventional 
vote model seems to provide an adequate fit to the data, we reject it in favor of a ra-
tional model based on the results of the test of the equal coefficients. 
Results based on the HP filter are less satisfactory for the rationality hypothesis: 
cyclical growth has a larger impact on the presidential vote than permanent growth 
does. Figure 1 indicates that the HP filter classifies a considerably larger compo-
nent of growth as cyclical than other specifications do. The trends estimated via the 
PL and BN specifications closely follow the actual real GNP values-large perma-
nent components and small cyclical components relative to the actual values. In 
contrast, the trend estimated via the HP filter has a smooth evolution with a rela-
tively small trend and large cycle.!! Thus, growth classified as cyclical by HP can 
be persistent over the medium term, and thus politically relevant. This result ex-
plains thc significant effect of cyclical growth in the presidential vote equation. 
Given the persistence of cyclical deviations as measured by the HP filter, it may in-
deed be rational for voters to reward and punish them. We should also note that the 
large cyclical component of output produced by the HP filter is a direct result of 
our arbitrary setting of.A to 1600. When smaller values for .A are used instead, the 
HP-based vote estimates mirror those of the PL decomposition more closely.!2 
Thus, the hypothesis of rational voting is robustly supported so long as the decum-
position procedure produces a large permanent component for output growth. 
Further, this result indicates the essence ofthe contextual nature of rational behav-
ior. Whether a particular behavior is judged as being rational depends on the con-
text in which the behavior takes place. 
lOFor each vote equation, we formally tested the hypothesis that coefficients for the permanent and 
cyclical growth arc equal. The tests used the PL-based vote model. The equal coefficients hypothesis 
was rejected in the entire vote model and independently in the presidential, Senate, and House equa-
tions. The Wald test statistics are X'(3) = l2.i7 (p < .01), x'(l) = 2.83 (p < .10), X'(I) = 5.63 
(p < .05), and X 2 (I) = 7.84 (p < .01), respectively. In other words, votes are more sensitive to pcnna-
nent than to cyclical growth. The detailed test results are available from the authors on request. 
II The real GNP growth rate is correlated with the P L, BN, and HP permanent growth rates on the 
order of .72, .95, and .54, respectively, during the 1948-1992 annual period. 
li\Ve reduced the A parameter value by taking a square root of the original value of 1600 repeatedly. 
The HP permanent growth rates estimated with A = 1600, A = 1600'", A = 1600\ and A = l600~'" arc 
correlated with the PL permanent growth rate on the order of.4l, .62, .69, and .72, respectivelv, durin!( 
the 1948-1992 period: the smaller the A value, the greater permanent growth component is estimated 
hy the H P filter. 
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CONCLUSION 
We reexamined voter rationality using post-World War II, U.S. national elec-
tion data. Our evidence cannot reject the view that voters are rational, a result that 
echoes conclusions of Chappell and Keech (1985), Peltzman (1990), and Alesina 
and Rosenthal (1989). We showed that voting behavior in presidential and congres-
sional elections could reflect marginal voters' awareness of economic constraints 
and the implications of vote choices for their long-term economic well-being. 
Particularly, the voters are more sensitive to permanent than cyclical economic 
growth when these two components are distinguished by a decomposition that 
finds a large, stochastic trend in the output process. The voters appear to make 
such distinction for their private economic activities (consumption) and use the 
knowledge for vote decisions. 
The finding that voters are retrospective does not imply that they are naive. 
Voters who distinguish permanent from cyclical growth need not fall prey to polit-
ical business cycles generated by manipulative politicians. Rather, marginal voters' 
concern with permanent growth would encourage governments to adopt policies 
that promote long-term rather than short-term income gains. It would be pointless 
for an incumbent party to create a preelection economic boom: cyclical growth 
would not yield significant electoral rewards from rational voters. Voting behavior 
described by Kramer (1971) and Fair (1978) has long been regarded as naive and 
manipulable. But this conclusion may have followed from a misinterpretation (per-
haps a misspecification) of the model of voting behavior. If enough marginal voters 
reward permanent growth, and if a large portion of growth is permanent, then one 
can see how the Kramer-Fair results emerge, even if the correctly specified model 
should distinguish temporary and permanent growth. 
Manuscript submitted 13 June 1994 
Final manuscript received 18 April 1995 
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